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ABSTRACT
While heuristic processing is often useful for quickly ascertaining information in
everyday situations, it can lead to inaccuracies when task demands become complex and more
systematic processing is required. These inaccuracies are often the result of confirmation bias, in
which information that is consistent with our beliefs is noted at the expense of disconfirming
evidence. The current decision making literature suggests that highlighting disconfirming
evidence – termed negative feedback - might work to engage deliberate, systematic cognitive
processes that lead to more accurate information acquisition. Using a probabilistic learning task
where feedback is not consistently accurate (Matchmaker), the first experiment in this study will
attempt to overcome confirmation bias by encouraging initial hypotheses to be considered from
confirming and disconfirming vantages. It is proposed that errors resulting from bias will thus be
made more salient and the testing of alternative solutions will be encouraged, resulting in greater
accuracy. A second experiment will explore the cognitive processes involved in bias
strengthening and determine if warnings of feedback error alter the way in which information is
interpreted.
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INTRODUCTION
As humans, we are tasked everyday with having to quickly and accurately sort through a
vast amount of information. In many circumstances, this speedy and unsystematic type of
heuristic processing works to our advantage and the conclusions we arrive at are sufficient to
allow us to proceed on to the next task at hand. However, there are times when quick and
intuitive judgments can lead to inaccurate conclusions due to a failure to systematically consider
all available information and weigh alternatives. One example of this is referred to as
confirmation bias, where learners only seek out information which is consistent with their initial
conclusions (Silverman, 1992; Lilienfield, Ammirati, & Landfield, 2009; Nickerson, 1998). It is
important to determine what cognitive processes allow such a bias to persist and to find
strategies to enhance systematic consideration of information to reduce bias.
Previous research has shown that prompting learners to engage in systematic analysis of
information can reduce reliance on heuristically based judgments. In one example, Natter and
Berry (2005) have demonstrated how prompting can be used to improve the understanding of
risk information for a fictitious medication. Participants were asked to imagine themselves as
patients being prescribed a medication associated with mild side effects in some of the people to
whom it is prescribed. Those in the control group passively read an informational pamphlet in
which they were told of a 2% risk of side effects and were instructed to observe a bar graph
depicting the 2% risk. The experimental group read the same pamphlet and information
regarding the 2% risk of side effects and was additionally instructed to indicate the amount of
risk by shading in the bar graph themselves. It has been found that using or producing graphs is
an effective strategy for encouraging deliberate processing and correcting heuristically based
assumptions due to an active engagement with the information to be learned (Stern, Aprea, &
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Ebner, 2003; Cosmides & Tooby, 1996). A questionnaire presented after the pamphlet had been
read asked participants to indicate the likelihood that they might experience the risk as well as
the number of people in 1000 who would be expected to experience the risk. The results
demonstrated that active engagement as a result of producing a graph led to more accurate risk
assessments. A second experiment illustrated that engaging in reflective questioning about the
presented information can have similar effects. By answering a reflective question regarding risk
(“How many out of 100 people who take this medication will experience one or more side
effects?”) before proceeding to the questionnaire, those in the active group demonstrated a better
understanding of risk than those who only read the pamphlet. These findings support the notion
that questioning increases the interaction between readers and the information, leading to a
deeper understanding of what is to be learned (Graesser, Baggett & Williams, 1996). This study
shows that when the number of hypotheses to be tested is clear and small, prompting to be
systematic can be quite effective.
However, relying on exhaustive systematic processing may not be optimal in all
situations due to the focus and sustained mental effort required. For example, when in an
emergency situation it may be necessary to act quickly without time to consider all of the
alternatives (Klein, 1999). Further, in everyday, real world situations, feedback is often less than
100% accurate and there may be variability in results across situations. For example, doctors
cannot presuppose that a medication that works for one patient will work equally well for
another. It has also been shown that tasks involving heavy perceptual or intuitive information,
such as wine tasting, are performed more poorly when participants attempt to systematically
describe their knowledge (Melcher & Schooler, 1996). Therefore when encouraging deliberate,
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systematic evaluation of information it is also important to understand that this kind processing
may not be optimal for a particular task (Gladwell, 2005; Klein, 1999).
Given the presence of bias in a multitude of every day contexts, from forming
assessments of interpersonal behavior to interpreting news reports, it is important to understand
practical ways in which unbiased processing can be encouraged. When attempting to engage in
decision making under the influence of an initial bias, people are more likely to rely on their
intuitive judgments at the expense of considering alternate possibilities (Kahneman, 2011).
Reliance on intuitive judgments in such situations is likely to increase the bias by selective
attention given to bias-consistent information. Current research indicates that information that
contradicts initial hypotheses (negative feedback) during learning can result in more deliberative
reasoning (Downer, Bhatt, & Montague, 2011). However, it remains unclear if such a strategy
will remain effective in the face of an existing bias because deliberate processing might be
subject to biased interpretation of feedback as well, particularly in cases were feedback is not
consistently reliable.
This study involves a probabilistic learning task (in which feedback is not 100%
accurate) and a situation where learners begin the task with a bias that is implanted in the
laboratory. These conditions, while very challenging to learners, reflect common conditions in
real world learning (for example, doctors prescribing medication or consumers purchasing a new
gadget). The experimental manipulations focus on two issues that may alter the use of
systematic processing in a probabilistic learning task: attention to negative outcomes and
knowledge of error during feedback. Additionally, this paradigm permits an objective measure
of bias strength initially and as it changes throughout the learning period to assess the effect of
learning strategies on bias (Ledet, 2013).
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The first experiment will require that participants consider their biased hypothesis from
both a confirming and disconfirming vantage. It is predicted that errors resulting from bias will
be more salient when learners are directed to make choices inconsistent with their bias, causing
participants to seek out and test alternative solutions. The second experiment aims to gain an
understanding of the underlying processes through which biases are reinforced or weakened by
examining the effect warnings of feedback error might have on decision making.
Confirmation Bias: Confirming What May Not Be True
Confirmation bias arises when people continue to seek out evidence consistent with
their beliefs even in light of information that speaks to the contrary (Silverman, 1992). In such
situations, holding steadfastly to the first decision that comes easily to mind can prevent other
more accurate decisions from being discovered. While our intuitive decision making processes
are largely useful for a multitude of tasks, there are times when the belief in our first, automatic
conclusions can be detrimental.
The most famous demonstration of the confirmation bias can be found in a task
developed by Wason (1960). In his triplet task, participants were given a triplet of numbers (2 –
4 – 6, for example) and asked to test hypotheses about the rule until the believed they discovered
the correct rule (which was any increasing sequence of numbers). After each triplet was
generated, they were given feedback about whether or not it fit the experimenter’s rule.
Participants were more likely to generate a specific rule, such as ‘increasing multiples of two’
rather than a more general but more accurate rule, such as ‘increasing numbers’. Even though the
more general rules would generate more correct results, participants tended to stick with the first
rule that allowed them to produce positive results. Thus, they rarely discovered the correct rule.
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Biasing occurs when we are influenced to think or believe a particular way about
problems and situations that prevents discovering a more accurate solution. Even when we are
trained scientifically to seek out instances that disconfirm our hypotheses, in day to day
situations we engage in confirmation bias, seeking out that which best conforms to our currently
held beliefs (Downar et al., 2011). Because our mind first brings forth occurrences in which our
solutions were effective and neglects those times when the same solutions have proven
ineffective, we have a natural tendency to discount negative feedback (Gilbert, 1991). In
neglecting to test other hypotheses, the participants in Wason’s experiment failed to see that their
first conclusion might not be the only outcome. Such a myopic focus on one outcome can have
detrimental implications when expanded to complicated real world scenarios, such as media
reporting and implementation of national policies.
Bodenhausen and Wyer (1985) highlighted the problems that can arise from biased
reasoning in complex scenarios. Subjects in their study were asked to recommend disciplinary
action for fictional employees based on workplace infractions and indicate the likelihood that the
infraction would occur again in the future. These infractions were either consistent or
inconsistent with American or Arab ethnic stereotypes, using names and infractions that were
established in a pilot study as being stereotypical of each group. They found that when biased
thinking occurred, subjects recommended more severe disciplinary actions for stereotypical
offenses and saw them as more likely to recur. Further, when asked to recall the scenarios of the
stereotypical cases, subjects recalled less information than for non-stereotypical scenarios. In a
subsequent experiment, participants were given additional life circumstances information that
might be used to illuminate a situational reason for the infraction and which could mitigate
reliance on stereotypes. Information about life circumstances served to decrease severity of
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disciplinary action and chance of recurrence only when stereotypes were not activated.
Providing the stereotypical name information lead to a discounting of life circumstances, which
was inconsistent with or irrelevant to the activated stereotype, resulting in recall for only
stereotype-consistent information. This study demonstrates that the activation of biases
prevented the integration of other decision relevant information, causing subjects to make
decisions based on partial information. Knowing this, it is important to consider what might be
driving an innate reluctance to consider multiple hypotheses.
In later work, Bodenhausen (1988) provided evidence that this neglect of alternative
hypotheses resulted from selective processing. When participants engaged in biased reasoning,
they paid special attention to the information that conformed to their beliefs, recalling a
significantly higher number of bias-consistent items than bias-inconsistent items. Acting as
jurors, subjects were to read a case file that contained neutral, exonerating, and incriminating
pieces of information for a defendant that was given either an ethically-nondescript or Hispanic
name. The name of the defendant was presented either at the beginning or at the end of the case
file. After reading the file they were asked to make guilt judgments and, after a delay period,
recall all of the information they could remember from the case file. They were then presented
with all of the evidence items and asked to assign a rating of the probative implications for each.
Those who read the stereotypical Hispanic name prior to reading the case file were more likely to
judge the defendant as guilty and more likely to rate all evidence items more negatively than
those who read the defendant’s name last. Once an expectation was in place, participants
seemed determined to justify that expectation even if that meant discounting evidence that might
disconfirm their initial reasoning.
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It is also important to note that because heuristic processes are often sufficient for day-today decision making, individuals tend to feel overly confident about all of their everyday
hypotheses regardless of actual accuracy (Gilovich, 1991). Due to the high confidence
associated with quick decision making, systematic and effortful processing of information fails
to occur (Thompson, Turner, & Penncook, 2011; Topolinski & Reber, 2010; Thompson &
Morsanyi, 2012). Indeed, it has been shown that when an answer comes to mind with little
strain, we actually experience pleasurable sensations that evoke a slight smile response
(Topolinksi, Likowski, Weyers, & Strack, 2009).
If we are prone to automatically rely on our first assessments and we have little reason to
doubt their veracity, how then might we be encouraged to engage in more deliberate and
systematic processes to arrive at more accurate results?
Strategies for Overcoming Confirmation Bias
Consider the Opposite. Research has found that when participants are instructed to
consider possible alternatives to their original hypothesis along with the confirming and
disconfirming evidence for each case, flaws in initial, intuitive responses are revealed. This
realization allows for an opportunity to discover the most accurate solution to a given problem.
By encouraging participants to consider several hypotheses, they can be induced to think that
their original solution is flawed and test alternative hypotheses to arrive at the appropriate
conclusion (Arkes, Faust, Guilmette, & Hart, 1988; Kray & Galinsky; 2003).
In one experiment utilizing a covert method to induce considering an alternative
hypothesis (Lord, Lepper, & Preston 1984), found evidence that this method helped participants
ask less biased questions. Participants were instructed to gather information about a person in
the next room and were given a list of questions to choose from in determining if the other
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person was an extrovert. The list included questions aimed at prompting about extroverted,
introverted, and neutral behaviors and was the same for all groups. Participants in one condition
were given a personality profile of an extrovert to aid in their selection, while those in a beunbiased condition were given additional instructions to be as accurate and fair are possible is
choosing questions to determine the person’s character. Importantly, participants in a considerthe-opposite condition were given the personality profile of an introvert under the guise that the
extroverted sheet had been misplaced. They were told that since introverts were the opposite of
extroverts, the sheet should prove just as useful. In comparison to the other two conditions,
participants instructed to consider-the-opposite were found to ask significantly fewer questions
aimed at determining extroverted behaviors and significantly more questions aimed at
determining introverted behaviors. This demonstrates that due to the covert suggestion of an
alternate personality type, participants were more likely to diversify their question selection. The
researchers were able to get participants to overcome biased hypothesis testing and successfully
encourage the testing of alternative hypotheses.
While studies like the one described above have expounded the benefits of seeking
alternative hypotheses (Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischoff, 1980; Mussweiler, Strack, & Pfeiffer,
2000; Hoch, 1985), still others have shown that confusion over relevant details (Cox & Popken,
2008) and an inability to spontaneously create alternative hypotheses (Sanna, Schwartz, &
Stocker, 2002; Schwarz, et al., 1991) can in fact lead to a strengthening of original hypotheses.
Findings like these have lead researchers to examine how confidence changes when participants
are instructed to consider the opposite hypothesis, or take into account information that
contradicts an initial belief. It has been demonstrated that that initial, heuristic judgments carry
with them a ‘feeling of rightness’ (Thompson & Morsanyi, 2012). Their easy and effortless
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accessibility leads to a pleasurable feeling we come to associate with being correct. Therefore,
when we cannot easily come up with an alternative to our initial hypotheses we become even
more confident in its efficacy. When the consider-the-opposite strategy is effective, the
acknowledgment of alternative solutions lessens our initial feelings of rightness and confidence,
thereby encouraging us to test other solutions that may be more accurate (Koriat, Lichtenstein, &
Fischoff, 1980; Arkes et al., 1988). When determining which circumstance can best enhance
decision making, these studies illustrate that we must also examine the roll that confidence plays
in these various scenarios.
Attention to Negative Feedback. To examine the ways in which people learn to make
accurate decisions and what may lead to the formation of spurious beliefs, Downar et al. (2011)
devised a probabilistic learning task through which they could study the performance of
experienced physicians. In the task, physicians were asked to prescribe one of two fictional
medications to simulated patients. Several relevant items of information were shown alongside
each participant to aid in choosing the correct medicine. While only one of these pieces of
information determined the best treatment, the physicians invariably created complex hypotheses
in trying to arrive at the correct answer. In fact, nearly half did not prescribe the correct
medications at much better than chance levels. Further analysis of the physicians’ progress
through the task indicated that provided feedback was not integrated into their initial hypotheses,
leading to diagnoses based on spurious factors. In sum, after an initial rule was determined, the
physicians failed to engage in systematic processing to test their hypotheses and instead relied on
their first instinct as correct.
While it is true that overall the physicians performed at near chance levels, the
researchers conducted a separate analysis of a high performing subset of the group who chose the
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optimal drug between 77% and 98% of the time. fMRI readings obtained during the task
revealed that these high performers showed greater activation in the prefrontal cortex after
experiencing a failed match whereas their lower performing peers showed this activation only
after successful matches. This increased activation suggests something unique about this group
in that, by being more attentive to failure, they were better able to integrate information in a way
that led to more accurate decision making. Conversely, low-performers who focused only on
information garnered from successes were more likely to fall victim to the confirmation bias and
were significantly less accurate.
It is evident from the results of this experiment that the effects of confirmation bias and
the formation of spurious beliefs can be reduced if learners are attentive to situations in which
their original beliefs are shown to be inaccurate. It also appears as though, under most
circumstances, paying special attention to this type of information is something we fail to do
intuitively.
More recent research has explored the effects that highlighting negative feedback has on
the decision making process. The Matchmaker task created by Ledet (2013) serves as a more
accessible alternative to the medical decision task for a general population (not trained
physicians). Importantly, the task was designed to produce a specific spurious hypothesis,
thereby establishing experimental control over the bias created in the lab. In this paradigm,
participants act as matchmakers for two simulated male bachelors with the goal of determining
what compatibility factors best predict a match for each bachelor. After being introduced to the
two bachelors with a photo and a brief description, participants are shown some sample profiles
that either client has rated a ‘good match’ for themselves. In the biased conditions, participants
were biased to believe that bachelors should be matched according to Entertainment Preference,
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with one bachelor preferring matches who liked sports and the other preferring matches who
liked video games. Next participants are shown many new profiles and are tasked with matching
the profile to the bachelor (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Schematic representation of Matchmaker task used by Ledet (2013). During the
Priming Phase for Biased groups, Frank was introduced followed by four sample matches
followed by James and four sample matches. Both block feedback and trial-by-trial feedback
sections during the Learning Phase were comprised of 54 trials. The test phase consisted of 12
trials.

Unlike in the task carried out by Downer et al. (2011), Matchmaker primed participants
with a specific bias (an Entertainment preference of sports for one bachelor and video games for
11

the other). During a priming phase, participants were introduced to each bachelor by reading a
paragraph that generally described the bachelor. Next, four sample matches were shown for each
bachelor. The first sentence of each match described a trait consistent with the spurious, biased
compatibility factor. This spurious factor had no bearing on whether or not the match would be a
good one in future selections. Only the compatibility factor of Hair Color was critical to
matching each client with a subsequent good match. During the priming phase, traits for the
critical factor were always mentioned after the spurious factor. In keeping with the design of the
Downar et al. (2011) probabilistic medical decision task, the critical factor resulted in subsequent
good matches 75% of the time and a bad match 25% of the time in the subsequent learning
phase. In the priming phase, the sample matches for a bachelor also corresponded to the matches
75% of the time (3 out of the 4 sample matches provided with respect to Hair Color).
This priming manipulation provides an added level of control, ensuring that all
participants are biased toward testing the same initial hypothesis at the start of the learning
phase. Additionally, establishing the same bias for all participants allows for the analysis of bias
congruent trials (where both the correct biased and critical factors for one bachelor appear
together) and bias incongruent trials (where the critical factor for one bachelor appears with the
biased factor for the other). This allows for a better understanding of whether participants are
relying on their bias to make decisions or if they are actively testing alternative hypotheses.
When relying on bias, participants would be predicted to achieve high accuracy on bias
congruent trials, as the primed and critical factors occur together. Correct rule learning
(assigning matches based only on Hair Color) would appear most evident on bias incongruent
trials. Because the biased and critical factors do not co-occur, reliance on bias will result in an
incorrect response. However, if the participant learns that the critical factor most consistently
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produces correct answers, they should use this information to guide their match making. As
such, accuracy on bias-incongruent trials should increase. Bias irrelevant trials were also
presented one-third of the time (with Entertainment Preference listed as movies). With no biasrelevant information present, accuracy on bias irrelevant trials depends on learning how to
correctly assign the critical factor of hair color.
Matchmaker also asked participants to provide a confidence rating after matching a
profile with a bachelor. The inclusion of a confidence rating provides insight into the type of
cognitive processes at work. When engaging in heuristic processing, answers come to mind with
ease and fluency. This ease creates a ‘feeling of rightness’ that increases confidence in the
accuracy of the immediately arrived at answer. Conversely, when engaging in systematic
processing, the effort required to arrive at a solution reduces confidence in the answer’s
correctness (Thompson, Turner, & Penncook, 2011; Topolinski & Reber, 2010; Thompson &
Morsanyi, 2012). This over-confidence can be problematic in complex situations when finding
the correct solution demands systematic thinking. For example, Zacharakis and Shepard (2001)
conducted a study of venture capitalists in order to understand how confidence affected their
ability to predict new venture success. Experienced venture capitalists were presented with cases
containing either five or eight relevant items of information in order to make their prediction.
Those who saw more information were found be more confident in their predictions for the
venture, but also were found to be less accurate.
Using Matchmaker, Ledet manipulated the salience of either successful or unsuccessful
trials by using red feedback screens and buzzer sounds to highlight failures in one condition and
green feedback screens and dinging sounds to highlight successes in another. It was
hypothesized that these external cues would highlight failure in such a way that would encourage
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systematic processing and increase accuracy, mimicking the successful strategy seemingly
utilized by Downar et al.’s (2011) most successful subset of physicians. This manipulation
succeeded in reducing participant confidence and increasing reaction time, factors consistent
with systematic processing in previous research (Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischoff, 1980;
Kahneman, 2011). However across all trial types, no significant differences in accuracy were
found between the negative-feedback and positive-feedback groups. Post-hoc analyses
examined the effect of feedback manipulation on each trial type. Learning would appear evident
if responses to bias incongruent trials became more accurate over time, indicating that the
influence of the biased compatibility factor has diminished and the critical factor alone was being
used to guide decision making. While accuracy on bias incongruent trials did increase as the
learning phase progressed, there were no differences between feedback groups and both achieved
accuracy at well below chance, around 24%. Further, while both negative-feedback and positive
feedback groups became less accurate on bias congruent trials toward the end of the learning
phase, mean accuracy remained around 85%. This suggests that learning was the result of task
exposure rather than feedback manipulation and that, while participants eventually recognized
the biased factor to be suboptimal for making matches, they were unable to determine the actual
critical factor. Ledet concluded that the ability to focus on failure is a primarily an internal trait
and one that is particularly difficult to alter. He speculated that participants stuck with their
initial biased reasoning because the emphasis on negative feedback reduced confidence in
systematic decision making, rather than reducing confidence in heuristic decision making as
intended.
Warnings of Feedback Error. In day-to-day situations, manipulations to avoid reliance
on our preconceived notions are hardly plentiful and often nonexistent. More often than not, we
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are expected to determine for ourselves when the information we encounter warrants skepticism:
the ubiquity of radio, television, Internet, and social media accounts of current events demand
that we consider the reliability of a variety of sources on a daily basis. We know that in most
situations a certain amount of error is present in the information we are receiving. How then do
our initial biases affect how we interpret such knowledge?
To begin to address this question, we might first consider how our ability to detect error
changes when we are explicitly made aware of its existence. Does knowledge of inconsistencies
have any impact on our ability to detect the instances when this is occurring? A recent study by
Biros, George, and Zmud (2013) aimed to determine what interventions might lead to better error
detection. In an experimental task, participants enrolled in a standard human resources training
course at a military base were required to make management decisions using data garnered from
the base’s human management information system. They were divided into three intervention
groups and one control group. The first intervention consisted of traditional training to detect
deceptive error within a widely used military human resource information system. The second
consisted of a warning prior to beginning the task that an administrator had tampered with the
system prior to being discharged and that this may affect their work on the exercises they were to
accomplish. Although warned of the error explicitly, participants were not told the exact amount
of error within the system, which was present in 14.5% of the data items they were to analyze.
The third intervention received both the training and warning just prior to beginning the task. It
was found that warning alone and warning combined with timely training were both significantly
effective in increasing participants’ ability to detect error within the system, thereby increasing
accuracy. Further, participants were found to take more time on trials where error was
successfully detected, indicating systematic and analytic processes at work.
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While warnings about error lead to task performance with a higher rate of accuracy, the
researchers did not consider how these results might change if participants were biased as to
what features of the database to focus on or what elements of the task had been altered. For
example, had the warning stated that tampering occurred because the administrator’s score on the
Enlisted Performance Report factor was not high enough to warrant an anticipated promotion,
the participants might have assumed error was confined to this field in the database. Such an
assumption could change task performance based on a bias to consider only one type of data
item. To examine the effect that warnings might have on biased assumptions, researchers have
taken advantage of the biases present within interpersonal relationships
A study carried out by Stiff, Kim, and Ramesh (1992) considered the effect that a
warning of deception would have on an established truth bias. The truth bias is a presumption of
truthfulness that can occur between two people in well-developed relationships. Repeated
exposure to a partner’s frequent truthful behavior leads to the assumption of truthfulness across
situations. Much like the confirmation bias, the truth bias is used heuristically and creates a
baseline of expectation. In their study, Stiff et al. recruited friendship dyads and split them into
interviewers and interviewees. The interviewees were to watch two video clips eliciting either
pleasant or unpleasant reactions and then told to either lie or be truthful about their reactions
when asked by their interviewer friend. Interviewers were not shown the video clips but rather
told that they were to question their friend about their reaction to what they were shown.
Interviewers in a suspicion-arousing condition were also told that some interviewees are told to
be truthful while others are told to respond deceptively during the interview. The researchers
found that when suspicion-arousing information was provided, reliance on the truth bias was
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significantly reduced and those interviewers were less likely to judge their friend’s behavior as
truthful.
From Stiff et al. (1992), we begin to understand how the mere suggestion of deception
can affect an otherwise well-established bias. Interrupting the use of biased, heuristic processes
encouraged participants to become more cognitively involved in their decision making. Indeed,
when Stiff and colleagues compared cognitive involvement across groups by coding the
information-gathering questions posed in the interviews, they found that interviewers with strong
truth biases asked significantly fewer cognitively demanding questions than those for whom the
bias had been disrupted.
While arousing suspicions effectively reduced reliance on bias and led to more critical
thinking, it is important to note that this did not make those participants any more accurate than
those in the non-suspicious group. In other words, whether interviewers were more or less
biased to believe that interviewees were being truthful had no influence on their ability to detect
actual truthfulness. Similar results were also found by Toris and DePaulo (1985) under a
comparable paradigm: interviewers warned that a paired interviewee may try to deceive them
became more suspicious and less confident but were no more accurate in their assessments of
truthfulness than controls.
These studies serve to show the strength of biases and the difficulties involved in
overcoming them. Even though warnings effectively reduce reliance on biased reasoning,
decrease confidence, and encourage critical thinking, biases persist to the extent that they prevent
accurate decision making. Thus it becomes important to understand the cognitive processes
underlying decision making under bias and how warnings of error affect those processes.
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Bias and the Interpretation of Exceptions
Once it is understood how biases affect the interpretation and representation of
information, strategies for increasing accuracy in spite of them can be developed. As
previously mentioned, Bodenhausen (1988) found support for the selective processing
hypothesis – that initial presentation of stereotype-activating information can lead to better recall
of stereotype-consistent evidence items than for other item types. In a follow up to his initial
experiment, Bodenhausen ensured that the stereotype itself was not simply being used as a
retrieval cue. Participants were to act as jurors after being presented with a defendant who had
either a stereotypical Hispanic or nondescript name. Exonerating, incriminating, and neutral
items were then presented one at a time and given a probative rating (-5 = extremely
unfavorable, +5 = extremely favorable). Rating evidence items as the information was first
presented aimed to encourage equal depth of processing across item type, regardless of
stereotypical consistency. The participants were then to make a guilt judgment and, after a short
delay, given a free recall task in which they were to recall as much information about the case as
possible. When asked to provide ratings of evidence on an item-by-item basis during encoding,
participants recalled all evidence items at a better rate, regardless of if a stereotype was activated
or not. When the stereotype was activated, both exonerating and incriminating items were
recalled the same proportion of the time. These results illustrate that while biases serve to
highlight only information that is consistent with a particular belief, recall of stereotypeinconsistent information can be fostered when all information is carefully considered during
encoding.
However, more recently, Williams, Lombrozo, and Rehder (2013) have examined the
effects of item-by-item processing when patterns are reliable or misleading (e.g. – patterns
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containing exceptions). The results of their study indicate a different set of processes and
outcomes. In a task similar that of Ledet’s (2013) Matchmaker, participants were shown 10
individuals along with some demographic and behavioral information and asked to determine if
the person rarely or frequently donated to charity. In one condition all descriptor information
perfectly predicated to donation likelihood. In another condition, some items were unreliable
with exceptions occurring twice in two of the descriptors. For example, while young age and
extroverted behavioral descriptors were typically associated with rare donators, two times it
occurred than an older individual or an introvert would also be seen to donate rarely.
Participants were either told to explain an individual’s behavior for each trial or that they would
be asked to explain the behavior later. After answering for donation frequency, they were given
the correct answer and briefly shown the individual again before continuing on to the next trial.
Those in the misleading conditions produced more errors than when the pattern was
reliable, and among explainers, those who were asked to provide trial-by-trial explanations
performed significantly worse than those who did not, particularly when items contained
exceptions. Rather than forming a nuanced representation of each individual, as would be
predicted from the results in the Bodenhausen (1988) study, participants focused only on those
features that adhered to largely supported patterns and ignored idiosyncratic information that
failed to fit. These findings would suggest that effortful attempts to explain feedback tap into
our human desire to form generalities and seek patterns. While this behavior is normally
adaptive, acting in such a way in complex scenarios can have adverse effects. These findings
suggest that, under certain conditions, deliberate processing could increase bias.
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Focus of the Present Study
Taken together, the aforementioned studies appear to provide a conflicting picture of
decision making under bias. The current study aims to provide further insight into effective
strategies for overcoming bias while examining factors that work to strengthen or weaken
reliance on bias in decision making.
The first experiment requires participants to deliberately make bad matches, intending to
stimulate opposite hypothesis testing (e.g. Entertainment Preference does not matter). Lord et al.
(1984) demonstrated that the considering of alternative hypotheses can be successfully promoted
through non-explicit suggestion, but did not examine how this strategy could be used to improve
accuracy performance. It is supposed that the physicians in the Downar et al (2011) study who
were able to improve accuracy through attention to negative feedback were relying on some
internal cue or trait to direct their attention. Conversely, students in the Ledet (2013) study were
presented with an external cue (a buzzer sound and red screen) as a means to highlight negative
feedback, which did not activate the cognitive processes necessary for systematic thinking that
would result in high accuracy. In directing participants to establish and answer a disconfirming
question internally, flaws in initial hypotheses are expected to become more salient. By
disrupting a biased approach to the task, participants are predicted to test alternatives and
become more accurate.
The Matchmaker program will be used to create an initial, consistent experimental bias
across all participants. The learning phase will be restructured such that one group will be told to
make bad matches half the time, allowing these participants to engage in deliberate
disconfirmation by considering the initial task question (“what makes a good match?”) from an
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opposite vantage (“what makes a bad match?). By getting participants to pose the disconfirming
question themselves, it is possible that more systematic thought processes will be engaged.
A second experiment will further explore the results of Bodenhausen (1988) and
Williams et al. (2013) by examining the effects of biased reasoning when participants are warned
of feedback error. The Matchmaker task is probabilistic, designed such that there is a 25%
chance of receiving incorrect feedback when a correct match is made. In this experiment, some
participants will be biased, warned of feedback error, and required to make trial-by-trial
assessments of feedback accuracy during the learning phase. Providing a warning should
encourage more systematic processing of information and increase overall accuracy (Biros,
George, & Zmut, 2013; Stiff, Kim, & Ramesh, 1992). By requiring that participants make
ratings of feedback veracity on a trial-by-trial basis, participants should be encouraged to think
critically about why the feedback for each trial is true or false. Should high accuracy occur
across all trial types, this would indicate that Bodenhausen’s (1988) strategy providing item-byitem Likert ratings is an effective way to distribute attention across all information items.
However, if bias-congruent trials are answered more accurately than bias-incongruent or biasirrelevant trials, this would indicate that, similar to the findings of Williams et al. (2013), itemby-item processing leads to increased reliance on biased reasoning when patterns are not always
consistent.
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EXPERIMENT 1
While direct instruction to consider opposite hypotheses has been shown effective in
getting participants to engage in more systematic processing (Lord, Lepper, & Preston, 1984;
Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischoff, 1980), such instruction has been noted as being cognitively
demanding and not practical in real-world scenarios where biases exist (Cox & Popken, 2008;
Sanna, Schwartz, & Stocker, 2002). Previous attempts by Ledet (2013) illuminated the
persistence of the confirmation bias under various conditions designed to overcome it, whether
by manipulating saliency of failures or increasing perceived task difficulty.
The proposed experiment will restructure the Matchmaker task (Ledet, 2013) by
encouraging participants to actively generate hypotheses counter to their initial bias. In the new
version of the task participants will be encouraged to view their initial (biased) hypothesis from
confirming and disconfirming vantages. Errors resulting from a biased approach are predicted to
be more salient. This should lead to exploration of alternative hypotheses and increased task
accuracy.
While Ledet’s version of the Matchmaker task consisted of a priming phase followed by
two learning blocks and a test phase, the first block of the learning phase (feedback provided
after three matches) will be removed (see Figure 1). Ledet included the initial learning block
because he was not sure that the bias would continue with more precise trial-by-trial feedback.
However, his study demonstrated that experimentally-induced bias persists throughout the
second block with trial-by-trial feedback.
To measure the strength of the initially induced bias, a baseline phase will be added prior
to the learning phase in which participants will make matches and indicate confidence in their
match but receive no feedback. This will provide a measure of bias strength at the outset of the
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task and as well as a measure of initial confidence to compare to confidence during the learning
and test phases. It is predicted that bias will be strongly present during the baseline phase, as
indicated by inaccuracy on bias incongruent trials along with high match confidence.
During the learning phase, participants will assign matches and indicate their confidence
in their performance. A biased task approach would be evident in consistent high accuracy and
confidence on bias congruent trials and inaccuracy on bias incongruent trials. A systematic
approach should reveal increasing accuracy on bias incongruent trials with lower confidence
across all trial types and more careful consideration of feedback as indicated by longer reaction
times.
Participants
Participants were 181 college students currently enrolled in psychology courses at
Louisiana State University participating for course credit. Participants were randomly assigned
to one of two groups: a task consistent (n = 90) or task switch (n = 91) group.
Materials and Procedure
The Matchmaker task was presented via EPrime software on standard PCs. Keyboards
were used to provide responses. The task was programmed to provide correct feedback 75% of
the time and incorrect feedback 25% of the time for all groups. Ratings of confidence and
response times were collected in addition to match assignments.
Participants were randomly assigned to two groups, a task-consistent group and a taskswitch group. Both groups proceeded first through a priming phase, in which the experimental
bias was established (See Figure 2). Specifically, participants were biased to believe that one
bachelor (Frank) prefers only matches who list sports as their Entertainment Preference and the
other bachelor (James) prefers only matches who list video games as their Entertainment

23

Preference. After each bachelor was introduced, four sample matches were presented. For
Frank, the first sentence for each of his four sample matches emphasized an interest in sports.
The first sentence for each of James’ sample matches emphasized an interest in video games (see
Figure 3).

Figure 2. Schematic representation of Matchmaker task for Experiment 1.
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Figure 3. Bachelor descriptions and sample matches for bias priming.

After priming, participants were to fill out a knowledge questionnaire. This questionnaire
listed each compatibility factor (Entertainment Preference, Age, Drinking Habits, Hair Color,
and Artistic Hobby) and asked participants to rate how important a particular factor was to each
bachelor on a 1 – 5 scale. Additionally, participants were to indicate which specific factor the
bachelor likes best (e.g. – Hair Color could be ranked at an importance level of 5, with brown
hair as most preferable).
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A baseline phase followed, during which participants attempted to make good matches
for the bachelors over 30 trials with no feedback. Matches were assigned using a 1 to 6 Likert
scale ranging from “Definitely Frank” to “Definitely James” for both groups. During analysis,
responses were be collapsed across “Frank” and “James” to provide an accuracy measure. The
entire scale was used to assess confidence, with high confidence indicated by use of “definitely”
assignments (e.g., “Definitely Frank”), moderate confidence indicated by use of “probably”
assignments, (e.g., “Probably Frank”), and low confidence indicated by use of “unsure” (e.g.,
“Unsure Frank”).
Equal exposure was given to bias congruent, bias incongruent, and bias irrelevant trials.
Bias congruent trials are those in which the biased compatibility factor (Entertainment) is paired
with the correct critical factor (Hair Color). Bias incongruent trials are those in which the biased
factor is paired with the incorrect critical factor. Bias irrelevant trials are those in which the bias
cannot be utilized (i.e., Entertainment preference is listed as Movies).
The groups then proceeded to the learning phase which consists of 60 trials, again with
equal exposure to all trial types. During the learning phase matches were made with those in the
task-consistent group making only good matches and those in the task-switch group alternating
between attempting to make good and bad matches. All participants were given feedback on a
trial-by-trial basis.
Those in the task-consistent group were told only to pair each match with the most
compatible bachelor. Feedback was shown stating either “You have made a CORRECT match.
The bachelor is compatible with this match” or “You have made an INCORRECT match. The
bachelor is NOT compatible with this match”.
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Those in the task switch-group were to alternate between making “good” and “bad”
matches every other trial. Before each good match trial, participants were told “You will now
assign Frank and James to their MOST COMPATIBLE match. That is, you will assign the match
to whomever they are MOST LIKELY to be compatible with”. Before each bad match trial,
participants will be told “You will now assign Frank and James to their LEAST COMPATIBLE
match. That is, you will assign the match to whomever they are LEAST LIKELY to be
compatible with”. On good match trials, feedback was the same as for the task consistent group.
For “bad match” trials, feedback stated “You have CORRECTLY made a bad match. The
bachelor is incompatible with this match” or “You have INCORECTLY made a bad match. The
bachelor is compatible with this match”.
Following the learning phase, participants then completed a test phase with instructions
to make the most compatible match for the bachelors on 30 trials, with no feedback given.
Lastly, participants were to complete a written system knowledge test, indicating the probability
for each of the bachelors in liking a match based on a particular compatibility factor.
Additionally, participants were able to make open-ended comments indicating their
interpretation of a best match for each bachelor
Results
All results are reported as significant at p < .05 unless otherwise indicated. For all
instances when Mauchly’s test indicated that sphericity had been violated, degrees of freedom
were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity.
Accuracy Performance. In order examine how bias and warning affected performance
throughout the task, separate 2 (group: task-consistent, task-switch) x 3 (phase: baseline,
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learning, test) mixed-model ANOVAs were conducted on the accuracy of bias incongruent, bias
congruent, and bias irrelevant trials.
First, a 2 x 3 mixed-model ANOVA examined performance on bias incongruent trials
throughout the task phase for task consistent and task switch groups (see Figure 4).

Figure 4. Accuracy performance on bias incongruent trials for Experiment 1.

There was a significant main effect of phase in incongruent trial accuracy, F(1.56,
277.68) = 228.96, MSE = .03 ƞp2 = .56. Pairwise comparisons revealed that accuracy was
significantly lower at baseline (M = .03, SE = .01) than at learning (M = .35, SE = .02) or test (M
= .34, SE = .34, SE = .01), but that learning and test accuracy did not differ from each other.
There was no main effect of group, F(1, 179) = 2.55, and no significant interaction between
phase and group, F(1.55, 277.68) = 1.22.
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In order to determine if making bad matches had any effect on accuracy for bias
incongruent trial types, a dependent samples t-test was conducted on the accuracy of good
matches and bad matches for learning trials in the task-switch group. Participants in this group
were found to be more accurate when making bad matches on bias incongruent trials (M = .40,
SE = .02) than when making good matches (M = .25, SE = .02), t(90) = -5.91, d = 1.25.
A second 2 x 3 mixed-model ANOVA compared accuracy on bias congruent trials at
baseline, learning, and test for task-consistent and task-switch groups (see Figure 5).

Figure 5. Accuracy performance on bias congruent trials for Experiment 1.

A main effect of phase was observed for accuracy on bias congruent trials, F(1.82,
325.05) = 140.61, MSE = .02, ƞp2 = .44. Pairwise comparisons revealed that all phases
significantly differed from one another, with accuracy performance highest at baseline (M = .98,
29

SE = .00), dropping at learning (M = .79, SE = .01), and rising again at test, (M = .84, SE = .01).
A main effect of group was observed, F(1, 179) = 13.2, MSE = .01, ƞp2 = .07, with pairwise
comparisons demonstrating that that the overall performance of the task-consistent group was
significantly better than the task-switch group on bias congruent trials throughout the task (M =
.89, SE = .01 and M = .86, SE = .01 respectively). A significant interaction was also observed
between phase and group, F(1.82, 325.04) = 19.82, MSE = .29, ƞp2 = .10, indicating that accuracy
on bias congruent trials at each phase of the task differed between groups. Independent samples
t-tests compared accuracy on bias congruent trials and revealed that the task-consistent group
was significantly more accurate on these trials at leaning (M = .85, SE = .13) than the task-switch
group (M = .72, SE = .13), t(179) = 6.91, d = 1.03. No differences were found between the
groups at baseline, t(179) = .15, or test, t(179) = .79.
In order to determine if making bad matches had any effect on accuracy for bias
congruent trial types, a dependent samples t-test was conducted on the accuracy of good matches
and bad matches for learning trials in the task-switch group. Participants in this group were
found to be more accurate when making good matches on congruent trials (M = .83, SE = .02)
than when making bad matches (M = .61, SE = .02), t(90) = 8.60, d = 1.81.
A 2 x 3 mixed-model ANOVA was conducted to analyze performance on bias irrelevant
trials at baseline, learning, and test between the two groups (see Figure 6).
A main effect of phase was observed for accuracy on bias irrelevant trials, F(1.83, 328) =
12.77, MSE = .03, ƞp2 = .07. Pairwise comparisons revealed that accuracy on these trials was
significantly worse at baseline (M = .53, SE = .02) than at learning (M = .60, SE = .01) or test (M
= .62, SE = .02), but that no significant differences existed between learning and test.
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Figure 6. Accuracy performance on bias irrelevant trials for Experiment 1.

While there was no main effect of group, F(1, 179) = 1.09, a significant interaction was
observed between phase and group, F(1.83, 328) = 8.91, MSE = .03, ƞp2 = .05, suggesting that
accuracy performance on bias irrelevant trials at each phase of the task differed between groups.
Independent samples t-tests revealed that the groups significantly differed in accuracy on bias
irrelevant trials at the learning phase, t(179) = 3.89, d = .58, with the task-consistent group
achieving higher accuracy (M = .64, SE = .17) than the task-switch group (M = .55, SE = .15).
No significant differences in accuracy were found between the two groups at baseline, t(179) = 1.63, or at test, t(179) = .74.
In order to determine if making bad matches had an effect on accuracy for bias irrelevant
trial types, a dependent samples t-test was conducted on the accuracy of good matches and bad
matches for learning trials in the task-switch group. Participants in this group were found to be
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more accurate when making good matches on irrelevant trials (M = .58, SD = .02) than when
making bad matches (M = .51, SE = .02), t(90) = 2.76, d = .58.
Confidence. In order to determine how confidence changed throughout the task, separate
2 (group: task-consistent, task-switch) x 3 (phase: baseline, learning, test) mixed-model
ANOVAs were conducted on confidence ratings for bias incongruent, bias congruent, and bias
irrelevant trials.
A 2 x 3 mixed-model ANOVA examined confidence on bias incongruent trials for both
groups at each phase of the task (see Figure 7). A significant main effect of phase was found,
F(1.73, 309.18) = 73.91, MSE = .12, ƞp2 = .30. Pairwise comparisons revealed significant
decreases in confidence on bias incongruent trials as participants progressed from baseline (M =
2.42, SE = .03) to learning (M = 2.09, SE = .03), and from learning to test (M = 2.03, SE = .03).
A main effect of group was found, F(1, 179) = 4.85, MSE = .10, ƞp2 = .03, and pairwise
comparisons revealed that the task-switch group was significantly more confident overall (M =
2.23, SE = .03) than the task consistent group (M = 2.13, SE = .03). The interaction between
phase and group was also found to be significant, F(1.27, 309.18) = 3.24, MSE = .12, ƞp2 = .02,
suggesting that the task-consistent and task-switch groups were differing their confidence on bias
incongruent trials during the phases of the task.
A follow-up independent samples t-test revealed that task-consistent groups were
significantly less confident (M = 2.00, SD = .42) than task-switch groups (M = 2.19, SD = .41) on
bias incongruent trials during the learning phase, t(179) = -2.99, d = -.44, but that the two groups
did not differ in confidence at baseline, t(179) = .18, or test, t(179) = -1.71.
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Figure 7. Confidence on bias incongruent trials for Experiment 1.

An additional dependent samples t-test was conducted in order to determine if confidence
differed for participants in the task-switch group when making good or bad matches on bias
incongruent learning trials. Confidence was significantly higher when making good matches (M
= 2.26, SD = .42) than when making bad matches (M = 2.11, SD = .45) for these trial types, t(90)
= 4.44, d = .93.
A second ANOVA examined confidence on bias congruent trials for both groups at each
phase of the task (see Figure 8). The main effect of phase was found to be significant, F(1.81,
324.41) = 67.91, MSE = .10, ƞp2 = .28. Pairwise comparisons revealed that confidence on bias
congruent trials decreased significantly both from baseline (M = 2.45, SE = .03) to learning (M =
2.22, SE = .03) and from learning to test (M = 2.08, SE = .03).
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Figure 8. Confidence on bias congruent trials for Experiment 1.

While no main effect was found for group, F(1, 179) = .50, the interaction between phase
and group was found to be significant, F(1.82, 324.41) = 3.11, MSE = .10, ƞp2 = .02, suggesting
that the task-consistent and task-switch groups were differing in their confidence on bias
congruent trials during the phases of the task. Follow-up independent samples t-tests revealed
that task-consistent groups were significantly less confident (M = 2.16, SD = .40) than taskswitch groups (M = 2.28, SD = .36) on bias congruent trials during the learning phase, t(179) = 2.16, d = -.32, but that the two groups did not differ in confidence at baseline, t(179) = .23, or
test, t(179) = .30.
An additional dependent samples t-test was conducted in order to determine if confidence
differed for participants in the task-switch group when making good or bad matches on bias
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congruent trials. Confidence was significantly higher when making good matches (M = 2.36, SD
= .35) than when making bad matches (M = 2.20, SD = .45) for these trial types, t(90) = 4.59, d =
.98.
A last ANOVA examined confidence on bias irrelevant trials for both groups at each
phase of the task (see Figure 9). A main effect of phase was found to be significant for
confidence on bias irrelevant trials, F(1.80, 321.54) = 45.23, MSE = .12, ƞp2 = .20. Pairwise
comparisons revealed that confidence increased significantly from baseline (M = 1.70, SE = .02)
to learning (M = 2.0, SE = .03), but not from learning to test (M = 2.0, SE = .03). The main
effect of group was not significant, F(1, 179) = 1.66, however, a significant interaction was
found between phase and group, F(1.80, 321.54) = 5.40, MSE = .12, ƞp2 = .03, suggesting that
the two groups were assigning different levels of confidence to bias irrelevant trials at different
phases of the task. Follow-up independent samples t-tests revealed the confidence at test was
trending toward being significantly higher at test for the task-switch group (M = 2.05, SD = .42)
than for task-consistent group (M = 1.91, SD = .50), t(179) = -1.94, d = -.29, but significant
differences did not exist at baseline, t(179) = 1.40, or learning, t(179) = -1.80.
An additional dependent samples t-test was conducted in order to determine if confidence
differed for participants in the task-switch group when making good or bad matches on bias
irrelevant learning trials. Confidence was significantly higher when making good matches (M =
2.08, SD = .40) than when making bad matches (M = 2.00, SD = .46) for these trial types, t(90) =
3.21, d = .68.
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Figure 9. Confidence on bias irrelevant trials for Experiment 1.

Response Time. In order to determine how response time changed throughout the task,
separate 2 (group: task-consistent, task-switch) x 3 (phase: baseline, learning, test) mixed-model
ANOVAs were conducted on response times for bias incongruent, bias congruent, and bias
irrelevant trials.
A first ANOVA examined response time on bias incongruent trials for both groups at
each phase of the task (see Figure 10). The main effect of phase was found to be significant for
bias incongruent trials, F(1.82, 325.80) = 2.94, MSE = 4233.66, ƞp2 = .02, with pairwise
comparisons indicating that participants were significantly faster at test (M = 4.08, SE = .14) than
at learning (M = 4.36, SE = .13).
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Figure 10. Response time in seconds on bias incongruent trials for Experiment 1.
A main effect was also found for group, F(1, 179) = 3.91, MSE = 9516.17, ƞp2 = .02, with
task-consistent participants exhibiting faster response times (M = 4.01, SE = .16) than taskswitch participants (M = 4.46, SE = .16). The interaction between phase and group was also
found to be significant, F(1.82, 325.80) = 7.48, MSE = 10785.92, ƞp2 = .04, suggesting that the
two groups were exhibiting different response times on bias incongruent trials at different phases
of the task. Follow-up independent samples t-tests revealed that, during the learning phase, the
task-consistent group was significantly faster (M = 3.87, SD = 1.32) than the task-switch group
(M = 4.86, SD = 2.05), t(179) = -3.87, d = -.58, but that the groups did not differ in response
times at baseline, t(179) = -.55, or test, t(179) = -.82.
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An additional dependent samples t-test was performed to determine if response time
differed for participants in the task-switch group when making good or bad matches on bias
incongruent trials. Response times differed significantly between good and bad matches, t(90) =
-6.04, d = -1.27, with good matches being made faster (M = 4.51, SD = 2.05) than bad matches
(M = 5.48, SD = 2.43).
A second ANOVA examined response time on bias congruent trials for both groups at
each phase of the task (see Figure 11). A main effect of phase was found for response times on
bias congruent trials, F(1.72, 307.36) = 21.36, MSE = 27569.41, ƞp2 = .12, with pairwise
comparisons indicating that response times on these trials decreased significantly from baseline
(M = 4.60, SE = .14) to learning, (M = 4.07, SE = .12), and from learning to test (M = 3.83, SE =
.12). A main effect of group was also found, F(1, 179) = 6.13, MSE = 12165.50, ƞp2 = .03.
Pairwise comparisons revealed that the task-consistent group exhibited significantly faster
reaction times overall on bias congruent trials (M = 3.91, SE = .21) than task-switch groups (M =
4.43, SE = .15).
The interaction between phase and group was also found to be significant, F(1.72,
307.36) = 4.00, MSE = 5169.06, ƞp2 = .02, suggesting that the two groups were exhibiting
different response times on bias congruent trials at different phases of the task. Follow-up
independent samples t-tests revealed that response times differed significantly between the
groups during the learning phase, t(179) = -3.90, d = -.58, with task-consistent participants
exhibiting faster times (M = 3.63, SD = 1.72) than task-switch participants (M = 4.51, SD =
1.80). There were no differences in response time between the groups at baseline, t(179) = -1.65,
or test, t(179) = -.88.
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Figure 11. Response time in seconds on bias congruent trials for Experiment 1.

An additional dependent samples t-test was performed to determine if response time
differed for participants in the task-switch group when making good or bad matches on bias
congruent learning trials. Participants did not differ in their response times when making good
or bad matches, t(90) = -1.36, d = -.29.
A third ANOVA examined response time on bias irrelevant trials for both groups at each
phase of the task (see Figure 12).
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Figure 12. Response time in seconds on bias irrelevant trials for Experiment 1.
A main effect of phase was found, F(2.358) = 48.75, MSE = 83483.10, ƞp2 = .21, with
pairwise comparisons revealing that response time significantly decreased from baseline (M =
5.62, SE = .17) to learning (M = 4.74, SE = .14), and from learning to test (M = 4.29, SE = .15).
A main effect of group was also found, F(1, 179) = 8.41, MSE = 25649.63, ƞp2 = .05, with
pairwise comparisons revealing that the task-consistent group was faster overall (M = 4.51, SE =
.18) as compared to the task-switch group (M = 5.26, SE = .18). The interaction between phase
and group was also found to be significant, F(2, 358) = 4.43, MSE = 7593.28, ƞp2 = .02,
suggesting that the two groups were exhibiting different response times on bias irrelevant trials at
different phases of the task. Follow-up independent samples t-tests revealed that the groups
exhibited significant differences in response time on bias irrelevant trials during the learning
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phase, t(179) = -4.42, d = -.66, with the task-consistent group responding faster (M = 4.13, SD =
1.43) than the task-switch group (M = 5.35, SD = 2.21).
An additional dependent samples t-test was performed to determine if response time
differed for participants in the task-switch group when making good or bad matches on bias
irrelevant learning trials. Participants did not differ in their response times when making good or
bad matches, t(90) = -1.40, d = -.30.
Bias Strength. In order to determine how bias strength varied throughout the task, a 2
(group: task-consistent, task-switch) x 3 (phase: baseline, learning, test) mixed-model ANOVA
was conducted on the computed difference score (accuracy on bias congruent trials minus
accuracy on bias incongruent trials) at baseline, learning, and test for both groups (see Figure
13).

Figure 13. Bias strength score throughout task for Experiment 1.
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A significant main effect of phase was found, F(1.76, 314.32) = 328.54, MSE = .05, ƞp2
=.65. Pairwise comparisons revealed that bias strength was significantly higher at baseline (M =
.96, SE = .01) than at learning (M = .45, SE = .02) or test (M = .49, SE = .03), but that strength
was significantly different between learning and test. While no main effect of group was found,
F(1, 179) = .285, a significant interaction between phase and group was found, F(2, 358) = 6.78,
MSE = .05, ƞp2 = .04, indicating that bias strength differed between groups throughout the phases
of the task. Follow-up independent samples t-tests revealed that bias strength differed between
the groups during the learning phase, t(179) = 3.11, d = .46, but not at baseline, t(179) = -1.43, or
test, t(179) = -.88.
Explicit Measure of Bias. In order to compare participants’ choice bias as indicated by
the above performance measures on the computerized matching task to their explicit indication
of bias, analyses were performed on ratings of compatibility factor importance provided by
participants in writing on hypothesis tests at baseline and test phases. Composite scores of
compatibility factor importance were calculated for each compatibility factor by averaging the
importance ratings for both bachelors. Of particular interest are the compatibility factors of
Entertainment Preference (biased factor) and Hair Color (critical factor).
A 2 (group: task-consistent, task-switch) x 2 (phase: baseline, test) mixed-model
ANOVA was conducted for ratings of Entertainment Preference at baseline and test for both
groups (see Figure 14). All results are reported as significant at p < .05 unless otherwise
indicated.
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Figure 14. Importance rating of entertainment preference for Experiment 1.

A main effect of phase was found on ratings of Entertainment Preference importance,
F(1, 167) = 147.82, MSE = .68, ƞp2 = .47. Pairwise comparisons indicated that Entertainment
Preference was rated as significantly more important at baseline (M = 4.72, SE = .05) than at test
(M = 3.63, SE = .08). A significant main effect was found for group, F(1, 167) = 7.04, MSE =
.38, ƞp2 = .04, indicating that task consistent and task switch groups rated Entertainment
Preference differently overall from baseline to test. Pairwise comparisons revealed that the taskswitch groups rated this factor as significantly more important (M = 4.30, SE = .07) than the
task-consistent group (M = 4.05, SE = .07). The interaction between phase and group was also
found to be significant, F(1, 167) = 4.63, MSE = .68, ƞp2 = .03, suggesting that groups were
rating Entertainment Preference differently at baseline than at test. Post-hoc independent samples
t-tests revealed that task-consistent and task-switch groups did not rate Entertainment Preference
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differently at baseline (M = 4.68, SD = .72 and M = 4.75, SE = .46 respectively), t(170) = -.8, d =
-.12. However, the task consistent group rated this factor lower at test (M = 3.41, SD = 1.10) than
did the task switch group (M = 3.88, SD = .99). This difference was found to be statistically
significant, t(169) = -2.97, d = -.46.
A 2 (group: task-consistent, task-switch) x 2 (phase: baseline, test) mixed-model
ANOVA was also conducted for rating of Hair Color importance for the groups at baseline and
test (see Figure 15).

Figure 15. Importance rating of hair color for Experiment 1.
This analysis revealed a main effect of phase, F(1, 168) = 55.97, MSE = .93, ƞp2 = .25,
with pairwise comparisons demonstrating that both groups rated this compatibility factor as
lower at baseline (M = 2.21, SE = .10) than at test (M = 3.0, SE = .11). The main effect of group
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was insignificant, F(1, 168) = .12, as was the interaction between phase and group, F(1, 168) =
3.37.
Although participants rated the biased compatibility factor lower at test than at baseline
and believed that the critical factor was more important at test than at baseline, descriptive
measures show that the biased factor was still seen as the most important factor in making a good
match at test (see Figure 16). The number of participants that endorsed the biased factor
important (rating it 4 or 5 on written tests after task completion) was greater for Entertainment
Preference than any other compatibility factor.

Figure 16. Compatibility factors endorsed as important at test.
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DISCUSSION
Encouraging participants to consider opposite hypotheses by making both good and bad
matches did not appear to be a particularly potent strategy for reducing reliance on bias in
decision making. However, both the task consistent and the task switch groups demonstrated a
reduction in bias strength as the task progressed, suggesting that simply proceeding through the
task and receiving feedback was enough to lower reliance on bias by nearly half. Although bias
was still being utilized, it appears as though some learning was occurring for both groups, as
demonstrated by increased accuracy on bias incongruent trials over the course of the task and
lower ratings of importance for the biased factor of Entertainment Preference at test. Participants
in the task switch group also demonstrated lower accuracy on bias congruent trials during the
learning phase, suggesting that alternative hypothesis testing may have been occurring at this
time. If such testing was in fact taking place, the gains in doing so were small. Participants in
the task switch group showed a return to reliance on bias at test, evidenced by increased accuracy
performance on bias congruent trials at this phase, as well as high and frequent ratings of the
importance of the biased factor of Entertainment Preference at this time.
In general, confidence for both groups decreased as the task progressed. However the
task switch group was shown to display higher ratings of confidence on both bias congruent and
bias incongruent trial types during the learning phase than the task consistent group. Because
lower confidence is associated with more systematic thinking, this finding provides further
evidence that the task switch group was not utilizing systematic reasoning processes throughout
the task. Similarly, slower response times in the task switch group are likely due to the effort
required to keep the proper goal in mind for each trial (e.g. making a good or bad match) rather
than engagement in more cognitively difficult information processing.
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EXPERIMENT 2
While some research has shown that providing warning of error can lead to increased
accuracy in decision making (Biros, George, & Zmut, 2013), other studies have shown that
warnings may not lead to the same results during decision making under bias (Stiff, Kim, and
Ramesh, 1992; Toris & DePaulo, 1984). Although presenting warnings under bias can lower
confidence and lead to deeper cognitive processing, it does not seem to lead to increased
accuracy. However, while Stiff et al (1992) found that warning biased participants of error in
feedback did not lead to increases in accuracy, they did not examine if elaborative encoding of
instances containing perceived error would improve performance.
Bodenhausen (1988) found that trial-by-trial ratings of information items can allow more
attention to be devoted to all items, not just those consistent with a bias. This should lead to an
integrated and precise understanding of information that serves to overcome the heuristic
processing that is a hallmark of biased reasoning. More recent work by Williams, Lombrozo, &
Rehder (2013) has found that focusing attention by generating explanations of feedback on a
trial-by-trial basis has the opposite effect: bias inconsistent items were less likely to be recalled
and a generalized impression was formed that focused on only those items that justified bias. The
proposed design seeks to explore these findings in a complex decision making task.
Experiment 2 used the Matchmaker task to examine the effect of warnings on biased
decision making. In addition, this experiment aimed to determine how focusing attention on the
information gleaned from each learning instance affects the interpretation of feedback veracity.
Under the Williams et al. (2013) theory of biased processing, we would predict that
providing an assessment for each instance of feedback will lead to a discounting of negative
feedback shown by low accuracy on bias incongruent trials, short reaction times, high match
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confidence, and low confidence of feedback when told matches are incorrect. However, if
making assessments for each instance of feedback encourages more systematic deliberation of
information, as indicated by Bodenhausen (1988), accuracy on bias incongruent trials should
increase as the task progresses and a holistic understanding of the task occurs. This systematic
processing would be evident as well in longer reaction times and lower match confidence.
Participants
Participants were 203 college students currently enrolled in psychology courses at
Louisiana State University participating for course credit. Participants were randomly assigned
to one of four groups: No Warning/Bias (n = 52), No Warning/No Bias (n = 51), Warning/Bias
(n = 52), and Warning/No Bias (n = 48).
Materials and Procedure
The same materials used in Experiment 1 were used in Experiment 2.
Participants assigned to the Biased conditions proceeded through the priming phase as
described in Experiment 1 (see Figure 17). They were biased to believe that Frank prefers only
matches who list sports as an Entertainment Preference and that James prefers only matches who
list video games as an Entertainment Preference. Participants in the Unbiased conditions were
not biased to believe the bachelors preferred any one compatibility factor. Additionally,
Unbiased participants viewed descriptions for sample matches that were randomized across
compatibility factors and told that these are simply random example matches (see Figure 18).
After the priming phase, a knowledge test was conducted as in Experiment 1.
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Figure 17. Schematic representation of Matchmaker for Experiment 2.
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Figure 18. Bachelor descriptions and sample matches for unbiased groups.

In the subsequent baseline phase, all participants were presented with 30 trials on which
they received no feedback, with equal exposure to all trial types. Again, ratings were given on a
Likert scale from 1 (“Definitely Frank”) to 6 (“Definitely James”).
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All participants next proceeded to the learning phase and were told that now they will
receive feedback after making each match in order to gain a better understanding of their
performance. Those in Warning conditions were also made aware that the computer will provide
incorrect feedback on some trials to simulate the experience of making the best matches when
client preferences are not always consistent. They were told that the incorrect feedback will
occur throughout the task, but overall feedback will be consistent enough that they should have
no trouble in determining the real qualities a client wants in a match.
During the learning phase participants made a match and received feedback after every
trial. For participants in the Warning conditions, after each match they were required to respond
to the question “Was the feedback accurate on this trial?” A Likert scale was used to assess
feedback accuracy from 1 (“Definitely Incorrect”) to 6 (“Definitely Correct”). Those in the No
Warning conditions did not make this judgment. All groups completed a total of 60 learning
trials and were exposed to equal numbers of trial types.
At the completion of the learning phase, participants moved on to the test phase. The test
phase consisted of 30 trials without feedback. Finally, a system knowledge test asked
participants to indicate the probability that each bachelor would prefer a match for each given
compatibility factor in order to determine changes in bias at the conclusion of the task.
Results
All results are reported as significant at p < .05 unless otherwise indicated. For all
instances when Mauchly’s test indicated that sphericity had been violated, degrees of freedom
were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity.
Manipulation Check. Independent sample t-tests were conducted for accuracy on bias
congruent and bias incongruent trials for biased and unbiased groups at baseline in order to test
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the effectiveness of the biasing and non-biasing manipulations. Accuracy scores were calculated
as the proportion of correct responses out of ten trials for each trial type.
Both Biased/No Warning and Biased/Warning groups preformed significantly different
on bias congruent and bias incongruent trials, t(51) = 39.50, d = 11.06, p < .001 and t(51) =
31.53, d = 8.83, p < .001 respectively. As expected from the biasing manipulation, performance
was near ceiling for both groups on bias congruent trials (M = .98, SD = .07 for Biased/No
Warning and M = .96, SD = .11 for Biased/Warning). Accuracy on bias incongruent trials was
markedly lower for both groups (M = .05, SD = .11 for Biased/No Warning and M = .05, SD =
.13 for Biased/Warning), indicating that the biasing manipulation was successful.
Unexpectedly, participants in Unbiased/No Warning and Unbiased/Warning groups also
demonstrated significant differences in accuracy on bias congruent and bias incongruent trials at
baseline, t(50) = 6.07, d = 1.71, p < .001 and t(47) = 4.66, d = 1.36, p < .001 respectively. Means
for each group indicated that participants were more accurate on bias congruent trials (M = .69,
SD = .24 for Unbiased/No Warning and M = .67, SD = .28 for Unbiased/Warning) than on bias
incongruent trials (M = .35, SD = .25 for Unbiased/No Warning and M = .32, SD = .28 for
Unbiased/Warning).
To determine if bias strength was similar between biased and unbiased groups at baseline,
a difference score was created by subtracting baseline accuracy on incongruent trials from
accuracy on bias congruent trials. A difference score of 1 would indicate that matches are being
made perfectly in line with the manipulated bias, a score of 0 would indicate no effect of bias,
and a score of -1 would indicate that matches are being made perfectly against the bias.
Correcting for variance, this test revealed that Biased groups were significantly more biased (M
= .92, SD = .19) than Unbiased groups (M = .34, SD = .45), t(129.5) = 11.69, d = 2.05, p < .001.
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Thus, although some bias appeared to be present in the Unbiased group, the strength of that bias
is significantly less than the bias that exists in the Biased group.
Accuracy Performance. In order examine how bias and warning affected performance
throughout the task, separate 3 (phase: baseline, learning, test) x 4 (group: Biased/No warning,
Unbiased/No Warning, Biased/Warning, Unbiased/Warning) mixed-model ANOVAs were
conducted on the accuracy of bias incongruent, bias congruent, and bias irrelevant
First, a 3 x 4 mixed-model ANOVA examined performance on bias incongruent trials
throughout the task phase for all groups (see Figure 19). There was a significant main effect of
phase on incongruent trial accuracy F(1.81, 359.42) = 187.6, MSE = .05, ƞp2 =.49. Bonferroni
corrected pairwise comparisons that accuracy was significantly lower at baseline (M = .19, SE =
.01) than at learning (M = .38, SE = .01) or test (M = .60, SE = .01), and that learning accuracy
was significantly less than test accuracy.
There was also a main effect of group on accuracy performance for bias incongruent
trials, F(3, 199) = 28.52, MSE = .02, ƞp2 = .3. Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons
indicated that there were no significant differences in accuracy performance on bias incongruent
trial between Biased/No Warning (M = .33, SE = .02) and Biased/Warning (M = .29, SE = .02)
groups, nor did differences in accuracy exist between Unbiased/No Warning (M = .48, SE = .02)
and Unbiased/Warning (M = .46, SE = .02) groups. Both Biased and Unbiased groups were
significantly different from each other, however.
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Figure 19. Accuracy performance on incongruent trials for Experiment 2.

A significant interaction was also found to exist between Phase and Group, F(5.42,
359.42) = 9.03, MSE = .05, ƞp2 = .12, indicating accuracy on bias incongruent trials at each phase
of the task differed between groups. Independent samples t-tests were conducted collapsing
across warning condition for biased and unbiased groups to examine how these groups differed
on incongruent trial type accuracy throughout the task. These tests revealed that, at baseline,
accuracy on these trial types was significantly worse for Biased groups (M = .05, SD = .12) than
Unbiased groups (M = .33, SD = .26), t(135.66) = -9.98, d = -1.71. Levene’s test indicated
unequal variances (F = 85.14, p < .001), so degrees of freedom were adjusted from 201 to
135.66. Biased groups continued to perform worse during the learning phase (M = .28, SD =
.02) than Unbiased groups (M = .48, SD = .18), t(196.96) = -7.11, d = 1.0. Levene’s test again
indicated unequal variances (F = 6.93, p < .05), and degrees of freedom was adjusted from 201
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to 196.96. However, Biased and Unbiased groups were showing equal accuracy performance at
test, t(201) = -.14, p > .05, (M = .59, SD = .24 and M = .60, SD = .24 respectively).
A second 3 x 4 mixed-model ANOVA compared accuracy on bias congruent trials at
baseline, learning, and test for each of the four groups (see Figure 20).

Figure 20. Accuracy performance on bias congruent trials for Experiment 2.

There was a significant main effect of phase on congruent trial accuracy F(1.71, 340.64)
= 69.13, MSE = .04, ƞp2 = .26. Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons indicated that baseline
accuracy (M = .82, SE = .01) was significantly better than learning accuracy (M = .74, SE = .01)
and test accuracy (M = .61, SE = .02), and that learning accuracy was significantly better than
test accuracy.
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A main effect of group on accuracy performance for bias congruent trials was found to
exist, F(3, 199) = 37.63, MSE = .02, ƞp2 = .36. Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons
indicated that there were no significant differences in accuracy performance on bias incongruent
trial between Biased/No Warning (M = .81, SE = .02) and Biased/Warning (M = .82, SE = .02)
groups, nor did differences in accuracy exist between Unbiased/No Warning (M =.63, SE = .02)
and Unbiased/Warning (M = .62, SE = .02) groups. Biased and Unbiased groups were found to
be significantly different from each other, however.
A significant interaction was also found to exist between Phase and Group, F(5.14,
340.64) = 17.54, MSE = .04, ƞp2 = .21, indicating accuracy on bias congruent trials at each phase
of the task differed between groups. Independent samples t-tests were conducted collapsing
across warning condition for biased and unbiased groups to examine how these groups differed
on congruent trial type accuracy throughout the task. These tests revealed that the groups
differed significantly at baseline, with Biased groups (M = .97, SD = .09) outperforming
Unbiased groups (M = .68, SD = .26), t(122.09) = 10.54, d = 1.91. Levene’s test indicated
unequal variances (F = 95.63, p < .01) and degrees of freedom were adjusted from 201 to
122.09. Biased groups were more accurate on bias congruent trials during learning as well (M =
.89, SD = .12), outperforming the Unbiased groups (M = .59, SD = .18), t(185.59) = 13.52, d =
1.98. Levene’s test again indicated unequal variances (F = 9.17, p < .05) and so degrees of
freedom were adjusted from 201 to 185.59. Biased and Unbiased groups were comparable in
accuracy by the time of test. Biased and Unbiased groups were comparable in accuracy on bias
congruent trials by the time of test, t(201) = -.70, p > .05, (M = .60, SD = .24 and M = .62, SD =
.23 respectively).
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A 3x4 mixed-model ANOVA comparing accuracy on bias irrelevant trials at baseline,
learning, and test for each of the four groups was also conducted (see Figure 21).

Figure 21. Accuracy performance on bias irrelevant trials for Experiment 2.

A main effect of phase was found for accuracy on bias irrelevant trials, F(1.82, 362.74) =
13.64, MSE = .04, ƞp2 = .06. Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons indicated that baseline
accuracy (M = .51, SE = .01) was significantly lower than learning (M = .59, SE = .01) or test (M
= .60, SE = .02) accuracy, but that no significant differences were found between learning and
test. There was no main effect of group, F(1, 199) = 2.21, and no significant interaction between
phase and group, F(6, 398) = .48.
Confidence. In order to determine how confidence changed throughout the task,
individual 3 (phase: baseline, learning, test) x 4 (group: Biased/No Warning, Unbiased/No
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Warning, Biased/Warning, Unbiased/Warning) mixed-model ANOVAs were carried out on
confidence ratings for each of the three trial types.
A first 3 x 4 mixed-model ANOVA was conducted to examine confidence on bias
incongruent trials for all groups throughout each phase of the task (see Figure 22). A main effect
of phase was found indicating that confidence differed for all groups across each phase of the
task, F(1.93, 383.04) = 68.67, MSE = .12, ƞp2 = .26. Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni
correction revealed that across all groups, ratings of confidence were higher at baseline (M =
2.01, SE = .03) than at learning (M = 1.73, SE = 1.73) or test (M = 1.78, SE = .02). Confidence
did not change on bias incongruent trials from learning to test.
The main effect of group was also found to be significant, F(1, 199) = 7.72, MSE = .25,
ƞp2 = .29. Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons revealed that the Biased/Warning group
provided significantly different confidence ratings (M = 2.00, SE = .04) than both the
Unbiased/Warning group (M = 1.78, SE = .04) and the Unbiased/No Warning group (M = 1.81,
.04). There was a significant interaction between phase and group, F(5.77, 383.76) = 3.86, MSE
= .12, ƞp2 = .06, suggesting that the groups expressed different levels of confidence on bias
incongruent items at the different phases of the task. Independent repeated measures ANOVAs
were conducted for examine this interaction for each group.
The main effect of phase for the Biased/No Warning group was significant, F(2, 102) =
27.37, MSE = .10, ƞp2 = .35, with Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons indicating that
confidence on bias incongruent trials was greater at baseline (M = 2.16, SE = .06) than at
learning (M = 1.73, SE = .06) or test (M = 1.80, SE = .04), but that learning and test were not
significantly different from one another.
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Figure 22. Confidence on bias incongruent trials for Experiment 2.

The main effect of phase was also significant for the Unbiased/No Warning group, F(2,
100) = 18.10, MSE = .11, ƞp2 = .27, with Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons indicating
that baseline confidence (M = 1.98, SE = .05) was significantly higher than confidence at
learning (M = 1.60, SE = .06) and learning confidence was significantly lower than confidence at
test (M = 1.77, SE = .05). Confidence did not significantly differ between baseline and test for
this group. The main effect of phase was significant for the Biased/Warning group, F(2, 102) =
27.17, MSE = .15, ƞp2 = .35, with Bonferonni corrected pairwise comparisons indicating that
baseline confidence (M = 2.32, SE = .06) was significantly higher than learning (M = 1.91, SE =
.07) and test confidence (M = 1.78, SE = .05), but that learning and test did not significantly
differ from one another. The main effect of phase was significant for the Unbiased/Warning
group as well, F(2, 94) = 6.39, MSE = .11, ƞp2 = .12, with Bonferroni corrected pairwise
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comparisons indicating that baseline confidence (M = 1.94, SE = .05) was significantly higher
than learning confidence (M = 1.71, SE = .05), but that no significant difference existed in
confidence between learning and test (M = 1.79, SE = .04), or baseline and test.
A second 3 x 4 mixed-model ANOVA examined confidence on bias congruent trials for
all groups at each phase of the task (see Figure 23). A main effect of phase was found, F(1.90,
377.09) = 52.29. MSE = .11, ƞp2 = .21. Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni correction
revealed that baseline confidence on congruent trials (M = 2.10, SE = .03) was significantly
different than learning (M = 1.88, SE = .03) and test (M = 1.78. SE = .02), and that confidence at
learning and test were different from one another. The main effect of group was found to be
significant, F(1, 199) = 20.08. MSE = .06, ƞp2 = .23. Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons
revealed that the Biased/No Warning (M = 2.00, SE = .03) and Biased/Warning (M = 2.03, SE =
.03) groups did not differ from each other, nor did the Unbiased/No Warning (M = 1.77, SE=
.03) or Unbiased/Warned (M = 1.82, SE = .04) groups differ from each other. The Unbiased/No
Warning group was significantly less confident than both biased groups and the Biased/Warning
group was significantly more confident than both of the Unbiased groups.
The interaction between phase and group was also found to be significant F(5.69, 377.09)
= 8.19, MSE = .11, ƞp2 = .11. Independent samples t-tests were conducted, collapsing across
biasing condition. These tests revealed that confidence was significantly different at baseline,
t(201) = 7.45, d = 1.05, with Biased groups displaying more confidence than Unbiased groups
(M = 2.29, SD = .40 and M = 1.91, SD = .33 respectively). Biased groups continued to be more
confident during learning (M = 2.05, SD = .44) than Unbiased groups, (M = 1.70, SD = .41),
t(201) = 5.98, d = .08. There were no significant difference between the Biased and Unbiased
groups at test, t(201) = .08.
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Figure 23. Confidence on bias congruent trials for Experiment 2.

A third 3 x 4 mixed-model ANOVA examined confidence on bias irrelevant trials for all
groups at each phase of the task (see Figure 24). A main effect of phase was found, F(1.79,
356.51) = 22.30, MSE = .11, ƞp2 = .10. Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons revealed that
confidence on bias irrelevant trials was higher at test (M = 1.77, SE = .02) than at baseline (M =
1.60, SE = .02) or learning (M = 1.58, SE = .03), but that baseline and learning confidence were
not significantly different from one another.
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Figure 24. Confidence on bias irrelevant trials for Experiment 2.
The main effect of group was found to be significant, F(1, 199) = 14.25, MSE = .05, ƞp2 =
.18. Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni correction revealed that confidence was not
significantly different for the Biased/No Warning (M = 1.55, SE = .03) and the Biased/Warning
(M = 1.54, SE = .03) groups, nor for the Unbiased/No Warning (M = 1.76, SE = .03) and the
Unbiased/Warning (M = 1.75, SE = .03) groups. The biased and unbiased groups were
significantly different from each other, however. The interaction between phase and group was
also found to be significant, F(5.36, 356.51) = 11.00, MSE = .11, ƞp2 = .14. Independent samples
t-tests were conducted to explore this interaction, collapsing across biased and unbiased groups.
The biased group was found to be significantly less confident on bias irrelevant trials at baseline
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(M = 1.35, SD = .31) compared to the unbiased groups (M = 1.85, SD = .36), t(201) = -10.54, d =
-1.49. These differences were not found to exist at learning, t(201) = -1.55, or test, t(201) = -.72.
Response Time. In order to determine how response time varied throughout the task,
individual 3 (phase: baseline, learning, test) x 4 (group: Biased/No Warning, Unbiased/No
Warning, Biased/Warning, Unbiased/Warning) mixed-model ANOVAs were carried out on
response time for each of the three trial types.
A first 3 x 4 mixed-model ANOVA examined response times on bias incongruent trials
for all groups at each phase of the task (see Figure 25).
A main effect of phase was found, F(1.61, 319.48) = 74.31, MSE = 19663.57, ƞp2 = .27,
indicating that response times differed during the task phases. Bonferroni corrected pairwise
comparisons indicated that baseline response times (M = 5.63, SE = .15) were significantly
different than both learning (M = 4.50, SE = .12) and test (M = 4.19, SE = .13) response times,
and that learning and test response times were significantly different from each other.
The main effect of group was not found to be significant, F(1, 199) = .97, MSE =
19663.57, ƞp2 = .06. The interaction between phase and group was significant, F(4.85, 319.48) =
4.55, suggesting that the groups differed in their response times at different phases of the task.
This interaction was explored with four repeated measures ANOVAs examining response time at
each phase of the task for each group independently.
An ANOVA for the Biased/No Warning group found the main effect of phase to be
significant, F(2, 102) = 7.59, MSE = 1477.38, ƞp2 = .13. Bonferroni corrected pairwise
comparisons revealed that response time was significantly slower at baseline (M = 5.57, SE =
.30) than at learning (M = 4.67, SE = .24), but that no significant differences in response time
existed between learning and test (M = 4.92, SE = .29) or baseline and test.
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Figure 25. Response time in seconds on bias incongruent trials for Experiment 2.

An ANOVA for the Biased/No Warning group found the main effect of phase to be
significant, F(2, 102) = 7.59, MSE = 1477.38, ƞp2 = .13. Bonferroni corrected pairwise
comparisons revealed that response time was significantly slower at baseline (M = 5.57, SE =
.30) than at learning (M = 4.67, SE = .24), but that no significant differences in response time
existed between learning and test (M = 4.92, SE = .29) or baseline and test. An ANOVA for the
Unbiased/No Warning groups was performed. Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of
sphericity had been violated from the main effect of phase, χ 2(2) = .75. Therefore degrees of
freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = .80). The main
effect of phase was found to be significant for the Unbiased/No Warning group, F(1.60, 79.81) =
15.78, MSE = 1740.11, ƞp2 = .24. Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons revealed that
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baseline response time (M = 5.30, SE = .25) was significantly slower than at learning (M = 4.19,
SE = .26) or test (M = 4.13, SE = .26), but that there were no significant differences between
learning and test. An ANOVA was performed for the Biased/Warning group. Mauchly’s test
indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated from the main effect of phase, χ 2(2)
= .55. Therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of
sphericity (ε = .69). A main effects of phase was found, F(1.38, 70.36) = 20.43, MSE = 2514.45,
ƞp2 = .29. Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons indicated that baseline response time (M =
5.371, SE = .35) was significantly slower than at learning (M = 4.57, SE = .25) or test (M = 4.11,
SE = .29), but that there were no significant differences between learning and test. Lastly, an
ANOVA was performed for the Unbiased/Warned group. Mauchly’s test indicated that the
assumption of sphericity had been violated from the main effect of phase, χ 2(2) = .74. Therefore
degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = .80). A
main effect of phase was found, F(1.59, 74.83) = 39.60, MSE = 2161.46, ƞp2 = 46. Bonferroni
pairwise comparisons revealed that response times differed significantly from one another at
each phase of the task, decreasing from baseline (M = 5.96, SE = .31) to learning (M = 4.59, SE =
.23), and again from learning to test (M = 3.59, SE = .20).
A second 3 x 4 mixed-model ANOVA examined response times on bias congruent trials
for all groups at each phase of the task (see Figure 26). A main effect of phase was found,
F(1.67, 332) = 104.81. MSE = 229141.47, ƞp2 = .35, indicating that the groups were exhibiting
different response times on bias congruent trials at different phases of the task. Bonferroni
corrected pairwise comparisons revealed that groups were significantly slower at baseline (M =
5.89, SE = .15) than at learning (M = 4.44, SE = .12) and test (M = 4.05, SE = .12).
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Figure 26. Response time in seconds on bias congruent trials for Experiment 2.

Response times were also found to be significantly slower at learning than at test. There
was no main effect of group, F(1, 199) = .77, and no significant interaction between phase and
group, F(1.67, 322) = 2.05.
A third 3 x 4 mixed-model ANOVA examined response times on bias irrelevant trials for
all groups at each phase of the task (see Figure 27). A main effect of phase was found, F(1.78,
353.16) = 96.18, MSE = 240100.49, ƞp2 = .33, indicating that the groups were exhibiting different
response times for bias irrelevant trials at different phases of the task. Bonferroni corrected
pairwise comparisons revealed that baseline response times (M = 6.28, SE = .17) were
significantly slower than learning (M = 4.83, SE = .14) and test (M = 4.30, SE = .14) response
times, and that learning and test response times were significantly different from each other.
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Figure 27. Response time in seconds on bias irrelevant trials for Experiment 2.
A main effect of group was also found, F(1, 199) = 5.17, MSE = 3087.21, ƞp2 = .07,
indicating the groups were exhibiting different response times over all phases of the task.
Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons revealed no differences between Bias/No Warning
(M = 5.78, SE = .24) and Biased/Warning (M = 5.42, SE = .24) groups and no differences
between Unbiased/No Warning (M = 4.59, SE = .25) and Unbiased/Warning (M = 4.76, SE =
.25) groups. However, both Biased groups were found to be significantly slower in their
response times than both of the Unbiased groups. The interaction between phase and group was
not significant, F(1.78, 353.16) = 1.92.
Bias Strength. In order to determine how bias strength varied throughout the task, a 3
(phase: baseline, learning, test) x 4 (group: Biased/No Warning, Unbiased/No Warning,
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Bias/Warning, Unbiased/Warning) mixed-model ANOVA was conducted on the computed
difference score (see Figure 28).

Figure 28. Bias strength score throughout task for Experiment 2.

A significant main effect of phase was found on bias strength, F(1.93, 383.83) = 280.16,
MSE = .07, ƞp2 = .59. Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons indicated that bias strength at
baseline (M = .63, SE = .02) was significantly greater than at learning (M = .36, SE = .02) and
test (M = .01, SE = .02), and that bias strength at learning was significantly greater than at test.
A significant main effect of group was also found for bias strength, F(3, 199) = 58.66,
MSE = .04, ƞp2 = .47. Pairwise comparisons were adjusted for multiple comparisons using the
Bonferroni correction. These comparisons indicated that there were no significant differences in
accuracy performance on bias incongruent trial between Biased/No Warning (M = .49, SE = .03)
and Biased/Warning (M = .54, SE = .03) groups, nor did differences in accuracy exist between
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Unbiased/No Warning (M = .15, SE = .03) and Unbiased/Warning (M = .16, SE = .03) groups.
Bias strength was significantly different between both Biased and Unbiased groups, however.
The interaction between phase and group was also found to be significant, F(5.79,
383.83) = 27.44, MSE = .07, ƞp2 = .29, indicating that bias strength at each phase of the task
differed between groups. Independent samples t-tests further explored this interaction by
collapsing across biased and unbiased groups to examine changes in bias strength throughout the
task. These tests revealed that, at baseline, Biased groups demonstrated a significantly stronger
bias (M = .92, SD = .19) than Unbiased groups (M = .34, SD = .45), t(129.50) = 11.69, d = 2.05.
Levene’s test indicated unequal variances and so degrees of freedom were adjusted from 201 to
129.50. Bias strength decreased for both Biased (M = .61, SD = .30) and Unbiased groups (M =
.11, SD = .27) during the learning phase, with the Biased group continuing to exhibit
significantly stronger bias, t(201) = 12.65, d = 1.78. Both groups showed equal bias at test,
t(201) = -.58, d = -.08, with Biased and Unbiased group demonstrating virtually no bias strength
(M = .00, SD = .22 and M = .02, SD = .23 respectively).
Explicit Measure of Bias at Test. In order to compare participants’ implicit bias as
indicated by the above performance measures on the computerized matching task to their explicit
indication of bias, analyses were performed on ratings of compatibility factor importance
provided by participants in writing at baseline and test. Composite scores of compatibility factor
importance were calculated for each compatibility factor by averaging the importance ratings for
both bachelors. Of particular interest are the compatibility factors of Entertainment Preference
(biased factor) and Hair Color (critical factor).
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A 2 (phase: baseline, test) x 4 (group: Biased/No Warning, Unbiased/No Warning,
Bias/Warning, Unbiased/Warning) mixed-model ANOVA was conducted for importance ratings
of Entertainment Preference at baseline and test for all groups (see Figure 29).
There was a significant main effect of phase on ratings of Entertainment Preference, F(1,
184) = 15.78, MSE = .80, ƞp2 = .08. Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni correction revealed
that this factor was rated as more important at baseline (M = 3.93, SE = .07) than at test (M =
3.56, SE = .08). A significant main effect was found for group, F(3, 184) = 32.12, MSE = 1.60,
ƞp2 = .08, indicating groups were providing different ratings of Entertainment Preference
importance across both task phases. Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons indicated that
there were no significant differences in ratings of Entertainment Preference importance between
Biased/No Warning (M = 4.27, SE = .11) and Biased/Warning (M = 4.35, SE = .12) groups, nor
did differences in accuracy exist between Unbiased/No Warning (M = 3.18, SE = .11) and
Unbiased/Warning groups (M = 3.20, SE = .12). Importance ratings were significantly different
between the Biased and Unbiased groups.
The interaction between phase and group was also found to be significant, F(1, 184) =
8.44, MSE =.80, ƞp2 = .12, indicating that the importance of Entertainment Preference changes at
each phase and is different across groups. Post-hoc independent samples t-tests for Biased and
Unbiased groups revealed that importance ratings for the biased factor of Entertainment
Preference was significantly different for biased groups at baseline and test, t( 93) = 6.91, d =
1.43, with bias decreasing from baseline (M = 4.7, SD = .59) to test (M = 3.9, SD = 1.03).
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Figure 29. Importance rating of entertainment preference for Experiment 2.

Because Entertainment Preference was the biased compatibility factor, these results
suggest that after completing the learning phase, Biased participants became significantly less
biased. Importance ratings of Entertainment Preference were not significantly different between
the two time points for Unbiased groups, t(93) = -.443, with ratings of Entertainment Preference
importance comparable at baseline (M = 3.15, SD = 1.10) and test (M = 3.22, SD = 1.20). This
suggests that Unbiased participants view this compatibility factor as only moderately important
throughout the task. Overall, these results indicate that while implicit measures of bias strength
as derived from the computerized matching task suggest that bias is near eliminated at the time
of test, all groups still rate the biased compatibility factor of Entertainment Preference as at least
moderately important when explicitly asked.
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A 2 (phase: baseline, test) x 4 (group: Biased/No Warning, Unbiased/No Warning,
Biased/Warning, Unbiased/Warning) mixed-model ANOVA was also conducted for ratings of
Hair Color importance at baseline and test for all groups (see Figure 30).

Figure 30. Importance rating of hair color for Experiment 2.
A main effect of phase was found, F(1, 183) = 45.23, MSE = 1.11, ƞp2 = .20. Bonferroni
corrected pairwise comparisons revealed that Hair Color was rated as significantly less important
across all groups at baseline (M = 2.0, SE = .09) than at test (M = 2.74, SE = .11). There was no
main effect of group, F(1, 183) = 1.40, and no interaction between phase and group, F(3, 182) =
1.40. These results suggest that after completing the learning phase, participants in all groups had
become more aware of the importance of the critical compatibility factor of Hair Color, although
they are still rating this factor as slightly less than moderately important and less important than
the biased compatibility factor of Entertainment Preference.
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Although participants rated the biased compatibility factor lower at test than at baseline
and believed that the critical factor was more important at test than at baseline, descriptive
measures show that the biased factor was still seen as the most important factor in making a good
match at test (see Figure 31). The number of participants that endorsed the biased factor
important (rating it 4 or 5 on written tests after task completion) was greater for Entertainment
Preference than any other compatibility factor.

Figure 31. Compatibility factors endorsed as important at test.
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DISCUSSION
Warning participants of error in feedback did not enable the participants in those groups
to achieve better accuracy than their unwarned counterparts. Rather, the accuracy performance
of those in the warned groups mimicked the performance on their unwarned counterparts on both
bias congruent and bias incongruent trials. Because warning in this experiment had no effect on
decision making, these data cannot speak to the theories posited by Williams, et al. (2013) or
Bodenhausen (1988).
While warning did not impact rule learning in this experiment, clear differences were
found to exist between the biased and unbiased groups, particularly during the baseline and
learning phases, with biased groups tending to achieve higher accuracy on bias congruent trials
and lower accuracy on bias incongruent trials at these times. Interestingly, all groups were
achieving comparable levels of accuracy on both trial types at the time of test. This suggests
that, as in Experiment 1, progressing through the task and receiving constant feedback is
sufficient for improving task performance. Importantly, bias strength in biased groups appears to
have vanished by the time of test as indicated by choice performance on the Matchmaker task.
These findings are striking when one considers the explicit rating of important compatibility
factors indicated at test. Although the critical factor is rated as being more important at test than
at baseline, it is still not rated as highly as the biased factor, which was overwhelming indicated
most frequently as an important factor by all participants. Clearly there is a disparity between
biased decision making during task performance and when asked explicitly about important
factors.
Confidence ratings again show that biased groups become less confident on bias
incongruent trials as the task progresses, which is to be expected as bias strength diminished and
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is no longer relied upon to make decisions when performing the Matchmaker task. All groups
displayed quicker response times as the task progressed, likely due to increased familiarity with
the procedure and rating system.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The experiments described in this paper aimed to determine if cognitive biases could be
overcome by utilizing particular strategies: considering opposite hypotheses and warning of
feedback error. These experiments also hoped to elucidate the cognitive processes that underlie
decision making when operating under bias.
In the first experiment, encouraging participants to consider opposite hypothesis and thus
make negative feedback more salient did not lead to better rule learning. Despite considering
both good and bad matches for each bachelor in the Matchmaker task, participants in this group
did not demonstrate better accuracy on any of the trial types throughout the task compared to
those not making alternating matches. This could be due to the fact that those in the task-switch
group were not effectively prompted to test opposite hypotheses by the instruction to make a bad
match, but rather simply used their bias to assign matches to opposite bachelor. For example,
instead of assigning Frank a match based on one of the other compatibility factors when told to
make a bad match, participants likely noted Entertainment Preference and assigned matches to
the bachelor who appeared biased toward the other Entertainment Preference option.
Both groups showed marked improvements in accuracy on bias incongruent trials from
baseline to test and diminished accuracy on bias congruent trials, which indicates that the
influence of bias was lessened as participants received feedback throughout the task. While the
task-switch group was slower to select a match during the learning phase, this was likely due to
the effort involved in reorienting to the presented instructions (good or bad match), rather than
any attempt to formulate hypotheses that countered their initial bias.
Interestingly, those in the task-switch group were found to be more accurate in their
matchmaking when making bad matches on bias incongruent trials, but not on other trial types.
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This, combined with their low performance on bias congruent trials during the learning phase,
suggests that the task-switch manipulation influenced feedback processing in some way. Exactly
how this might have occurred remains unclear as performance during the learning phase did not
influence final test outcomes.
In Experiment 1, bias strength diminished for both groups in similar ways as the task
progressed, suggesting that simply proceeding through the task and receiving feedback was
enough to lessen dependence on the bias initially created when first introduced to each bachelor.
In this experiment, bias was not completely eliminated for either group, although it was reduced
by nearly half for both groups. This reduction in bias strength is reflected in the explicit
responses on the provided test forms, which required participants to rate the most important
compatibility factors at baseline and test. Both groups rated the biased factor of Entertainment
Preference lower at test than baseline and stated that Hair Color was more important at test than
at baseline. Although bias strength diminished, participants still reported the biased
compatibility factor of Entertainment Preference as being the most important compatibility factor
in determining a best match when explicitly asked. Taken together, these results indicate that
progression through the task while receiving probabilistic feedback lead to a reduction in bias at
an implicit level as reflected in task performance, but this bias was still influencing the explicit
determination of the most important compatibility factor.
A second experiment examined the ways in which warning participants of errors in
feedback might impact their decision making on the Matchmaker task. Warning appeared to
have no effect on the decision making process, as warned biased and unbiased groups achieved
the same levels of accuracy as their unwarned counterparts. It is possible that participants in
both groups had developed strong ideas of bachelor preferences after the baseline phase, and

77

these ideas about what makes a good match persisted in spite of warnings of feedback error. It
may also be the case that since participants were unable to draw strong conclusions about when
feedback was inaccurate, the warning was ignored altogether.
All groups showed significant improvement in their accuracy performance on bias
incongruent tasks and decreased accuracy on bias congruent trials, with accuracy on both at
moderately above chance by the time of final test. These results suggest that after 60 learning
phase trials, participants in the biased groups had learned that the original bias primed factor of
Entertainment Preference was not predictive in making good matches and may have been testing
other alternatives. Similarly, those in unbiased groups may have been testing hypotheses during
the learning phase which lead to a better understanding of good matchmaking.
The measure of bias strength in biased groups reached zero by the end of the task, which
indicates that reliance on Entertainment Preference had been eliminated by the time of test.
However, explicit ratings of the importance of each compatibility factor on hypothesis tests at
the test phase demonstrated that participants were still rating the biased factor of Entertainment
Preference as the most important determinant of a good match. As with the first experiment, a
discrepancy is found to exist between performance on the Matchmaker task, which indicates that
participants no longer relying on bias to make good matches, and their explicit indicators of
important factors. When asked directly, participants still express an allegiance to their initial
bias.
One finding of this experiment that is difficult to explain is why participants in the
unbiased groups demonstrated some preference for Entertainment Preference at baseline when
this factor was never made specifically salient to them. Although performance on the
Matchmaker task indicates that reliance on this bias had been eliminated at test, these

78

participants also rated Entertainment Preference as the most important factor in assigning a good
match when explicitly asked to do so. A potential explanation is that a match’s description
always listed Entertainment Preference first, and so participants paid more attention to this
information than to the other compatibility factors that followed. Future iterations of this task
should randomize the presentation of compatibility factors during the learning phase to test this
hypothesis.
The salient finding from this set of these experiments reveals the power of feedback on
decision making in probabilistic learning. Neither of the manipulations meant to encourage
effortful, systematic processing of information lead to improvements in performance, suggesting
that these cognitive processes are not useful for learning in these types of tasks. Similar
outcomes were found in previous iterations of the Matchmaker task. Ledet (2013) reported that,
in highlighting negative feedback through the use of an unpleasant buzzer sound and red
feedback screen, accuracy was increased from baseline to test during the task but explicit
statements of relevant factors still revealed a reliance on bias. In both of these experiments, it
appears as though feedback alone was sufficient to improve overall accuracy. That this
improvement in accuracy was revealed only through task performance suggests that this learning
relies on automatic processes operating below the threshold of explicit awareness. When asked
to explicitly state how decisions are being made, participants still reported using their biased
reasoning, even though their task performance suggested otherwise. Thus it appears as though
subconscious rule learning is occurring, but that this information has not been consciously
integrated into conscious, deliberative reasoning processes.
These findings speak to recent critiques that dual process models, which advocate a quick
and intuitive cognitive system and a slow and deliberate cognitive system, are overly simplistic
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(De Neys, 2012). Rather than one system being purely intuitive and another system acting as
purely rational, fMRI evidence has indicated that there is some subconscious awareness that fast,
intuitive reasoning may be incorrect, allowing fast, rational processes to be utilized efficiently.
Studies using conditional reasoning statements as stimuli have been used to demonstrate that
when asked to make fast judgments about the validity of such statements, participants are able to
use quick and intuitive cognitive processes to provide accurate answers (Thompson, 2014;
Handley, Newstead, & Trippas, 2010). It was suggested that these errors in biased reasoning
may have occurred because responses were based off of beliefs, which could be more compelling
than simple logic.
Feedback in these experiments may have powerfully influenced intuitive reasoning due to
being present completely and consistently. In the Matchmaker task, participants were given a
correct or incorrect message after assigning every match, which lead to bias strength reduction.
In the real world, this type of constant feedback in relatively uncommon. We might not always
receive feedback or the feedback we chose to pay attention to might only serve to complement
our already existing biases. For example, if one holds certain political beliefs, they are more
likely to consume information from news sources that support those beliefs and ignore those
counter them, or not be aware of every instance in which information regarding those beliefs is
present so that they may adjust beliefs accordingly. In this case, feedback serves to support
existing beliefs due to selectivity and inconsistency in presence. Consistency and completeness
of feedback have been shown to be important in previous versions of the Matchmaker task, with
feedback being reported intermittently (every 5 trials) was not as effective in improving learning
as when it was present at every trial (Ledet, 2013).
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In conclusion, the experiments presented in this study served to demonstrate the power of
bias in making accurate decisions. Enlisting strategies meant to encourage systematic processing
of information did not appear to be beneficial; rather, feedback alone served to reduce implicit
reliance on bias and improve decision making. That this accuracy on task performance did not
translate to explicit recognition of bias reduction suggests that conscious processes were not
involved in eliminating reliance on bias. Future studies may be interested in investigating if
prolonged time in the learning phase would encourage the involvement of explicit cognitive
processes, leading to conscious awareness of correct rule learning.
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